This paper examines tax evasion in the diesel fuel market. Diesel fuel used for on-road purposes is taxed, while other uses are untaxed, creating an incentive for firms and individuals to evade on-road diesel taxes by purchasing untaxed diesel fuel and then using it for on-road use. We examine the effects of a federal regulatory innovation in October 1993, the addition of red dye to untaxed diesel fuel at the point of distribution, which significantly lowered the cost of regulatory enforcement. We find that sales of diesel fuel rose 26 percent following the regulatory change while sales of heating oil, which is an untaxed perfect substitute, fell by a similar amount. The effect on sales was higher in states with higher tax rates and in states likely to have higher audit costs. We also find evidence that heating oil sales are less responsive to demand factors such as temperature prior to the dye program, indicating that a significant fraction of pre-dye sales was illegitimate. Furthermore, we find a pattern of price and tax elasticities consistent with innovation in new evasion techniques subsequent to the regulatory change. Finally, we estimate that the elasticity of tax revenues with respect to the tax rate was 0.60 prior to the dye program, yet would have been 0.85 in the absence of evasion.
Introduction
Tax evasion and tax collection are important elements of fiscal policy. Lack of compliance with tax laws are likely to alter the distortionary costs of raising a given level of government revenue and may affect the distributional consequences of a given tax policy. Furthermore, resources spent evading taxes represent a deadweight loss to the economy. Despite the central importance of tax evasion in public finance, our understanding of the degree of evasion and its response to the rate of taxation and government enforcement is limited.
Detecting tax evasion and estimating how it responds to tax and enforcement policy have traditionally been difficult since those engaging in evasion wish to keep this behavior concealed.
Furthermore, disentangling the effects of tax rates and audit intensity from other unobserved factors is not straightforward. Audit intensity is likely to be endogenously related to the propensity to evade, as auditors focus collection resources toward groups of taxpayers likely to evade. Also, variation in tax rates across individuals or firms is often correlated with evasion opportunities.
For instance, higher income individuals face a higher marginal tax rate and at the same time may have more income from sources that are easier to conceal. The value of providing empirical evidence regarding these questions is high, as even theoretically the response of evasion to tax rates is not clear.
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The diesel market provides an interesting setting to study tax evasion. The taxation of diesel fuel varies significantly by use. Despite being virtually identical to the diesel used for on-road purposes, diesel fuel consumed for off-road use such as residential heating, industrial use, farming or off-road travel is untaxed. In 2005, consumers using diesel fuel for on-road purposes faced federal highway taxes of 24.4 cents per gallon in addition to state highway taxes that range from 8 to 32.1 cents per gallon. Some localities tax on-road diesel as well, altogether placing the tax burden at over 50 cents per gallon in many states. The close substitutability and differential taxation of on-road and off-road diesel create strong incentives for firms to evade diesel taxation by purchasing untaxed diesel fuel and using or reselling it for on-road use.
In this paper, we consider the impacts on tax evasion of a regulatory innovation that greatly decreased the cost of monitoring compliance with on-road diesel fuel taxes. In October 1993, the Federal Highway Administration began adding red dye to untaxed diesel fuel. The dye allows inspectors to readily check for untaxed diesel through simple visual inspection, reducing the cost of auditing for regulators and increasing the cost of achieving a given level of diesel tax evasion for firms.
We estimate the effects of fuel dye using two identification strategies. Our first identification strategy examines the magnitude of the discontinuity in sales of diesel fuel and untaxed fuel oil, a perfect substitute, upon the introduction of fuel dye. We estimate a 25 to 30 percent discontinuous increase in sales of diesel fuel at the start of the fuel dye program, or 0.067 gallons per person per day for the average state. Sales of untaxed fuel oil fell 0.066 gallons per day.
Consistent with the predictions of a model of tax evasion, the magnitude of the discontinuity is greater in states with high tax rates and states likely to have high initial monitoring costs.
Our second identification strategy formalizes a test for evasion that compares diesel's elasticity with respect to taxation with its elasticity with respect to prices. Importantly, the test is based only on sales of the taxed good and, thus, applicable to contexts in which we do not see illicit sales of untaxed alternatives. 2 We find a significant gap between diesel's response to prices and taxes in the pre-dye period, rejecting the null hypothesis of no evasion. This gap disappears for four years following the introduction of fuel dye as previous methods of evasion were made less effective. Beginning in 1998, the gap reappears, consistent with criminal innovation in response to the dyeing program.
We show how the estimates of the price and tax elasticities can be used to obtain an estimate of the derivative of evasion with respect to the tax rate. We estimate that a one cent increase in diesel taxes raises evasion by 16.5 thousand gallons per day. While this estimate requires observing only taxed sales, we can compare it with a more direct estimate obtained from fuel oil sales. We estimate that fuel oil sales increase by 25 thousand gallons per day in response to a one cent change in the tax rate.
Finally, we use the estimated tax and price elasticities to describe how evasion affects tax revenues. We estimate that the tax revenue elasticity with respect to the tax rate is 0.60 in the pre-dye period and 0.71 after the implementation of the dye program. If no evasion existed in this market, these values would be 0.85 and 0.90, respectively. Therefore, the impact of tax changes on revenues increased in the post-dye period, and over half of this increase can be attributed to decreased evasion.
Our paper relates closely to the literature measuring tax evasion and its responsiveness to incentives, and more broadly to empirical studies attempting to uncover evidence of illegal 2 The techniques we use to infer evasion by comparing tax and price elasticities relate closely to the work of Chetty et al (2007) . They examine consumer tax salience by comparing the demand response to changes in specific liquor taxes, which are incorporated in the price quoted to consumers, with the demand response to changes in ad valorem taxes, which are not part of the posted price but instead paid at the register. Similarly, Rosen (1976) compares the response of female labor supply to taxes and wages. Tax salience is unlikely to be an issue with diesel sales, as the tax is incorporated in the price quoted to the consumer. activity. Several approaches have been taken in prior literature to measure tax evasion. An indirect approach involves observing aggregate quantities such as currency demand or national income and product accounts and inferring evasion from these quantities.
3 A second approach utilizes cross-sectional variation across taxpayers in observed levels of compliance using the Taxpayer Compliance Monitoring Project (TCMP), which describes the outcome of IRS audits of randomly chosen tax returns. 4 A third approach taken in the literature uses experimental methods to investigate tax compliance and its response to tax rates and enforcement.
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The approach most closely related to that taken in our paper is that of Fisman and Wei (2004) , who examine the misclassification of Chinese imports from Hong Kong. They find that the gap at the detailed good level between reported Chinese imports from Hong Kong and reported exports from Hong Kong to China is largest for goods with high tax and tariff rates. Section 2 presents some background related to diesel markets and taxation and Section 3 describes a model of the firms' tax evasion decision. Section 4 describes the data to be used. Section 5 presents the primary empirical evidence, the response of sales to the dye program. Section 6 provides results implementing the test of evasion and derives estimates of the responsiveness of evasion to tax rates. Section 7 concludes.
Regulatory Background
The taxation of diesel fuel varies by use. Diesel fuel used on-road is subject to federal highway taxes of 18.4 cents per gallon and state highway taxes of 9 to 32.1 cents per gallon. Federal fuel taxes are the primary source of funding for the Federal Highway Trust which funds infrastructure 3 See for instance Gutmann (1977) , Feige (1979) utilizes total dollar transactions relative to GDP, and Pommerehne and Weck-Hannemann (1996). 4 Clotfelter (1983) finds a positive relationship between individuals' marginal tax rates and the degree of evasion. Feinstein (1991) pools two different years to address the simultaneous relationship between income and marginal tax rates and finds a negative relationship between tax rates and tax evasion. Dubin and Wilde (1988) and Beron, Tauchen, and Witte (1992) find that increasing the chances of an IRS audit is associated with higher reported adjusted gross income. 5 Slemrod, Blumenthal, and Christian (2001) study the distributional impact of tax evasion in an experiment where randomly selected taxpayers were sent letters warning of close scrutiny of their tax returns. Treated low and middle income taxpayers reported higher AGI than the control group, but treated higher income individuals reported less. Other experimental approaches include Wenzel and Taylor (2004) and Alm and McKee (2005) investment. In addition, environmental regulations limit the amount of allowable sulfur content of on-road diesel fuel. 6 Diesel fuel consumed for farming or off-road travel, or as fuel oil for residential, commercial or industrial boilers is not subject to highway taxes and is not required to meet similar sulfur limits.
Variation in taxation and environmental stringency by use create strong incentives for firms to evade taxation. Evaders purchase untaxed diesel fuel and use or resell it for on-road use without paying the appropriate highway taxes. In the 1980's, the most common method of evasion was the "daisy chain", in which a company would purchase untaxed diesel fuel and resell the diesel fuel to an affiliate to make it more difficult to audit the transaction. The affiliate would then resell the fuel to retail stations as diesel for which highway taxes had been collected. 7 In 1992, the Federal Highway Adminstration estimated that firms evaded between seven and twelve percent of on-road diesel taxes, approaching $1.2 billion dollars of federal and state tax revenue annually. While evasion was also a concern for other fuels, including gasoline, kerosene and jet fuel, diesel fuel presents a special situation. Both taxable and non-taxable uses are significant. In 2004, 59.6 percent of distillate sales to end users were retail sales for on-highway use. 8 This creates the incentive to develop evasion schemes for on-road diesel taxes, as well as provides access to large quantities of untaxed diesel fuel.
In response to "daisy chain" evasion, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) innovated. Beginning October 1, 1993, new regulations required fuel dye be added to all diesel fuel not meant for on-highway use. 9 Beginning January 1, 1994, the point of federal highway taxation for diesel fuel was moved to the wholesale terminal. As a result, any untaxed diesel fuel sold at the wholesale terminal was required to be dyed and consumption or sale of dyed fuel was made illegal.
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The IRS and EPA regulations reduce the cost of enforcement, and increase the cost of common evasion schemes like the "daisy chain." Fuel dye allows regulators to randomly test trucks through a simple visual inspection, substantially reducing the cost of monitoring. Moving 9 EPA regulations relating to sulfur content began Oct 1993. IRS regulations relating to diesel on which on-highway taxes had not been collected were enacted as part of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 and began Jan 1994. 10 The federal penalty for consuming or selling dyed fuel ("red diesel") for on-road use is the greater of $10 per gallon of fuel or $1000. In addition to penalties for evading federal taxes, individual states penalize firm caught evading state taxes. Denison and Eger (2000) document fuel evasion penalties for a subset of states in 1997.
the point of taxation to the point of sale at the wholesale terminal serves a dual purpose.
Prior to 1994, the government collected fuel taxes from both wholesale terminals and the diesel distributors -firms who transported diesel from the wholesale terminal to the retail station.
Moving the point of taxation reduces the number of firms responsible for collection on-road taxes, making it less costly to collect taxes and enforce dyeing of untaxed fuel. In addition, moving the point of taxation increases the costs of evasion for standard "daisy chain" evasion.
IRS monitoring rose following the introduction of fuel dye.
11 In addition, funding for fuel tax enforcement increased in 1994 and has risen subsequently.
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A Model of Fuel Tax Evasion
To motivate our empirical model, we consider a model of fuel tax evasion with a continuous measure of firms purchasing diesel fuel for on-road (taxed) use. 13 Although we consider the case of a firm evading taxes on an input to production, we could analogously frame the problem as one of a consumer choosing quantities of a legally and illicitly purchased good. Firms jointly choose how much diesel fuel to purchase, q, and the proportion of untaxed (illegal) diesel fuel, α, to produce output x(q). Firms purchase taxed diesel fuel at price p + t. Firms which purchase untaxed diesel fuel at price p incur a heterogeneous cost of evasion which is quadratic in purchases of untaxed diesel fuel, and are assessed a fixed penalty if caught evading taxes by the regulator. Prior to the firms' decisions, the regulator observes the punishment associated with evasion, the distribution of heterogeneous evasion costs, the cost of auditing, and p and t and chooses the probability with which it will audit firms, p a , to maximize total tax revenues less the cost of auditing.
Depending on the firm's cost of evasion, firms either choose to fully evade the regulations by purchasing only untaxed diesel fuel, partially evade the regulations by purchasing a mix of taxed and untaxed diesel fuel, or fully comply by purchasing only taxed fuel. Diagram 1 graphically represents how taxed and untaxed diesel consumption vary with the evasion cost parameter, γ.
For firms with values of γ above the partial/non-evasion cutoff,γ NE , the expected penalty outweighs the benefit of evasion. These firms fully comply with the regulations by only purchasingq units of taxed diesel. The discontinuity in taxed fuel consumption atγ NE is a result 11 Baluch (1996) tabulates IRS staff hours related to audits and enforcement of diesel fuel taxes and finds that staff hours rose approximately three and a half times, from 151,190 hours in 1992 to 516,074 hours in 1994. 12 The initial budget for fuel tax enforcement in the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act was $ 7.5 million per year. The budget for 2008 is $ 12 million per year. In addition, states can spend up to one percent of their Surface Transportation Program funding on fuel tax enforcement. 13 Here we present the intuition and relevant results -see the appendix for a formal presentation of the model.
of the fixed punishment. With a fixed penalty, purchasing an epsilon amount of untaxed fuel is dominated by non-evasion. Partially-evading firms, with heterogeneous costs of evasion between γ F E andγ NE , also purchaseq total units of diesel fuel. Partial-evaders purchase untaxed fuel up until the point at which the marginal cost of evasion is equal to the tax rate. Firms below the full/partial evasion cutoff,γ F E , only consume untaxed fuel. Fully-evading firms consume untaxed fuel up until the point that marginal revenue is equal to price plus the marginal cost of evasion, which is strictly less than the tax-inclusive price. As a result, fully-evading firms consume more thanq units of diesel fuel.
Anticipating firms' choices, the regulator endogenously chooses the probability with which to audit, p a , to maximize tax revenues less auditing costs. Consistent with intuition, audit intensity decreases with the cost of auditing, c a , and increases with the tax rate, t. An increase in t increases the marginal benefit of auditing -an increase in c a increases the marginal cost of auditing.
Empirical Predictions
We derive three sets of testable predictions which we would expect to hold if fuel tax evasion exists and if the use of fuel dye reduces evasion: (1) predictions of the magnitude of the discontinuity in sales before and after the introduction of the fuel dye, (2) predictions of the seasonality in fuel oil sales pre-and post-dye, and (3) predictions of the price and tax elasticity of taxed and untaxed diesel fuel.
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We derive predictions of the magnitude of the discontinuity in sales at the time of dye introduction from the derivative of market demand for taxed and untaxed fuel, Q t and Q u , with respect to the cost of auditing c a . In our context, fuel dye reduces the cost of monitoring diesel fuel tax compliance. With lower auditing costs, the regulator optimally increases audit intensity. As a result, we expect consumption of untaxed diesel to fall and consumption of taxed diesel to rise as a result of the regulatory innovation. In addition, the theoretical model predicts correlations between state characteristics and the magnitude of the discontinuity in sales at the time of the fuel dye introduction. High state tax rates create greater incentive for evasion as well as a greater change in enforcement following a decrease in audit costs. Thus, our model predicts that the magnitude of the discontinuity in sales should be greater for high tax jurisdictions than low tax jurisdictions. In addition, if monitoring is initially more difficult in states with substantial markets for untaxed diesel fuel, we would expect the discontinuity to 14 We include the formal derivation of the testable predictions in the appendix.
be greater in jurisdictions with high legal demand for untaxed diesel fuel.
A second set of testable predictions compare pre-and post-dye seasonality in fuel oil sales.
Seasonality of fuel oil demand differs substantially by use -residential demand for home heating is greatest during the winter, while industrial and commercial demand exhibit little seasonality.
We expect illegal purchases of untaxed fuel oil, for use on-highway, to reduce seasonality in states where a large proportion of households use fuel oil for home heating. In addition, if evasion declined in the post-dye period, seasonality in fuel oil sales should increase post-dye in states with substantial residential fuel oil demand.
We derive a final set of testable predictions based on the short-run price and tax elasticity of taxed diesel fuel. Absent evasion, a change in either the tax-exclusive price or the tax rate should reduce sales of taxed diesel equally. If firms evade taxes, an increase in the tax rate causes partial evaders to substitute from taxed to untaxed diesel and causes marginal firms at the non-evasion and full-evasion cutoffs to begin to partially or fully evade diesel taxes, respectively. Thus, we would expect taxable sales to respond more to a change in taxes than a change in prices if evasion exists. If evasion declines as a result of fuel dyeing, the gap between the response of diesel sales to taxes and prices should decrease. We derive analogous predictions for sales of untaxed fuel oil. If firms evade taxes by purchasing untaxed fuel oil, we would expect an increase in the tax rate to increase sales of fuel oil. Furthermore, the effect of the tax rate on fuel oil sales should decline post-dye.
Data
We use state-level data from the Energy Information Administration ( program was implemented, even though the discontinuity in the month of implementation is less striking than with diesel due to the seasonality of fuel oil sales. Overall, the increase in diesel is largely canceled out by the decrease in fuel oil sales, at least in the first year of implementation.
The EIA publishes the monthly average price of No. 2 distillate by type of end user for the majority of states. When unavailable for a particular state, we utilize the price in the Petroleum Administration for Defense District (PADD) in which the state is located. To measure the price of diesel for on-road purposes, we use the price to end users through retail outlets. This is virtually a perfect match of the low-sulfur diesel price, which is almost exclusively intended for on-highway use in the post-dye period.
We obtain information about the federal and state on-road diesel tax rates from The only post-dye variation in the federal tax rate was a temporary 0.1 cent reduction in 1996.
In Panel B we plot the average state tax. 15 The average state tax has increased monotonically over time, starting at approximately 12 cents per gallon in 1983 and increasing to over 21 cents per gallon in 2003. This figure also plots the number of states changing their tax rates in each year. It is common for a state to change its tax rate -in most years, between 6 and 23 states change diesel tax rates. 16 Between-state variation also rises throughout the period. To model legitimate demand for No. 2 fuel oil, we also capture demand factors, primarily related to temperature and prevalence of the use of fuel oil as a home heating source. We obtain data on monthly degree days by state from the National Climate Data Center at the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. The number of degree days in a month is often used to model heating demand and is a measure of the amount by which temperatures fell below a given level on a particular day, summed across the days of the month. We also measure state heating oil prevalence from the 1990 census using the fraction of households in a state reporting fuel oil as the primary energy source used for home heating.
Finally, we instrument for diesel prices using the Brent crude oil spot price and event dummy variables corresponding to the first and second Iraq wars and the 2002 Venezuelan oil strike.
Brent crude is a globally-priced commodity commonly used as an instrument for regional product prices. 17 The validity of this instrument depends on the extent to which demand shocks for US diesel are incorporated into world oil prices. This effect is likely to be small given that US diesel demand accounted for approximately 4.6% of world crude production in 1993 and 4.9% of world crude production in 2005.
18 Table 1 displays summary statistics of the data. In the first two rows we show the pre-and post-means for the two primary variables of interest -No. 2 diesel, which is largely used for taxed purposes, and No. 2 fuel oil, which is reported to be used for entirely untaxed purposes.
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The average state-month in the pre-dye period saw 1.4 million gallons of diesel sold per day, slightly greater than the 1.3 million gallons of fuel oil sold per day. This difference grows considerably in the post-period, when diesel sales rise to 2.3 million gallons per day while fuel oil sales fall to 0.8 million gallons per day.
The average tax in the pre-dye period represents a significant fraction of the purchase price in the typical state. In the pre-dye period, the average state plus federal tax is 30.5 cents per gallon, compared with a tax excluded price of 77.8 cents per gallon for purchasers of diesel through retail outlets. This represents 28 percent of the final purchase price. Taxes are growing over time, representing 35 percent of the purchase price in the post-period. The price of sales to residential users, which is likely to represent sales of home heating oil, is higher than the tax excluded retail price of No. 2 distillate, likely due to the incorporation of delivery costs. Missing values are common in the EIA quantity series. In months where few suppliers are serving a particular state, the quantity value is suppressed by the EIA if it is possible to infer the sales from a particular firm. For diesel, 9 percent of observations are missing in the pre-dye period compared to 20 percent in the post-dye period. In the case of fuel oil, missing values represent 10 and 24 percent of the state-months in the pre-and post-dye periods, respectively.
Although we estimate our results off of the non-missing observations, the results change little when we instead interpolate the missing values using state specific time trends.
Dye Program and Diesel Misreporting
In this section we examine the response of No. 2 diesel and No. 2 fuel oil sales to the diesel dye program. The main effect of the program was to substantially reduce the cost of monitoring firm tax compliance. Our model predicts that as the cost of monitoring declines, enforcement rises and firms comply more fully, reporting more taxed purchases and fewer untaxed purchases.
Since evasion here simply involves mislabeling the use of No. 2 distillate, there should be no adjustment costs in production and therefore the primary effect of the dye program on quantities should be seen immediately.
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To evaluate the response of reported taxed and untaxed sales of No. 2 distillate, we estimate a specification of the break in trend of log quantity of the form
where lnq it is the log of the quantity of diesel or fuel oil sold in state i in month t, X it is a vector of state-month covariates, and ρ i represents a state fixed effect. The function f (t) reflects overall time trends in the demand for gallons, which we parameterize using a flexible quadratic polynomial whose slope is allowed to vary in the pre-and post-dye periods. 20 These are outputs of the distillation process of crude oil, however are in general not substitutable with No. 2 distillate. Some outputs can be blended with No. 2 diesel to lower the sulfur content or the tax per unit, though this is only possible to a very limited extent. 21 It is possible that some adjustment may occur over time if firms learn about the effect of the program on the likelihood of getting caught, or if detecting evaders becomes easier as fewer firms evade. While plausible, these mechanisms are difficult to distinguish empirically from unrelated shifts in demand for diesel over time. In addition, anticipation of the dye program would conservatively bias our results. Figure 4 shows the fit of the quadratic time trend to average actual log diesel sales. The quadratic time trend seems highly successful at fitting the time profile of diesel sales. In the specification shown in column 2 of Table 2 , we include state effects and other state-month covariates and find that the estimated discontinuity is stable when adding these controls. In the full specification, the estimated discontinuity in diesel is 26 percent.
Counteracting the increase in diesel sales is a decrease in the sales of fuel oil. Columns 3-4 of Table 2 display estimates of the discontinuity of fuel oil sales. We estimate that the average state experienced a 31 percent decrease in fuel oil sales, controlling only for the quadratic time trend.
Again the estimated coefficient is fairly stable when adding covariates. In the full specification, we estimate a 39 percent decrease in fuel oil sales due to the dyeing program. As with diesel fuel, While the log specification allows one to easily assess the magnitude of the discontinuity in percentage terms, a drawback is that it does not allow for a direct evaluation of the substitution between diesel and fuel oil. The model presented in Section 3 suggests that this substitution will be on a one-for-one basis, however this cannot be evaluated in the log specification due to the different levels of diesel and fuel oil.
22 While the log specification will be preferred in estimating demand elasticities, to more directly evaluate the substitution between diesel and fuel oil we estimate (1) using the level of sales as the dependent variable. To account for the difference in levels across states, we form per capita sales by normalizing quantities by yearly state population. Panel A of Table 4 shows the results for per capita diesel sales. Column 1 repeats the base specification for the full sample. We first split the sample by the prevalence of heating oil use for home heating as reported in the 1990 census. Consistent with our hypothesis, the dye response is heavily concentrated in high heating oil states. These states experienced an increase in diesel sales of 0.09 gallons per person per day, compared with an increase of 0.04 gallons in states with a low prevalence of home heating oil.
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We next split the sample between low and high diesel tax states, as measured by states' tax rates in December of 1992, prior to the announcement of the dye program. The estimated break in the diesel series is larger in states with high tax rates, with an estimated break of 0.077 gallons per person per day. The increase is 0.059 gallons in low tax states.
Panel B of Table 4 shows the results of similar specifications for per capita fuel oil use.
Similar to the diesel results, fuel oil sales fell by more in states with high heating oil use by households, where sales were 0.079 gallons per person per day lower post-dye, compared to low-heating oil states, where sales were lower by 0.055 gallons. Unlike with diesel, however, the estimated decline in fuel oil sales is similar for high-versus low-tax states.
In Panel C, we present evidence regarding the response of fuel oil's share of number 2 distillate to the dye program, which will summarize the substitution between diesel and fuel oil post-dye. Finally, we provide additional evidence that a greater portion of fuel oil sales were legitimate post-dye, by examining the seasonality in fuel oil sales in the pre-and post-dye period.
Seasonality varies by state, depending on the nature of fuel oil demand. Residential demand for fuel oil peaks strongly during the winter. Industrial and commercial demand for fuel oil is slightly higher during the summer, largely from greater use of fuel oil for electric generation.
Thus, northern states with a high proportion of households using fuel oil for home heating tend to have much higher demand during the winter than the summer, while states with insignificant residential demand tend have slightly higher sales during the summer. Based on our estimates that at least 30-40 percent of fuel oil purchases in the pre-dye period were illegally used for on-highway purposes, we expect fuel oil sales in the pre-dye period to exhibit less seasonality, particularly in states with a high proportion of households using fuel oil for home heating.
In Table 5 , we present estimates of the seasonality of fuel oil demand pre-and post-dye. In the first specification, we regress log fuel oil sales on the number of degree days in a particular state-month, the number of degree days interacted with the fraction of households in the state who reported using heating oil as the primary home heating fuel in the 1990 census, sets of pre-and post-state fixed effects and a pre-and post-quadratic time trend. To estimate the change in seasonality, we interact the first two explanatory variables with a post-dye dummy variable. Specifications (2) and (3) include state-invariant and state-specific month fixed effects, respectively.
In the first two specifications, we estimate a small, but significant, negative coefficient on degree days and a large, positive and significant coefficient on the interaction between degree days and the fraction of homes using fuel oil. States with substantial residential demand peak strongly during the winter, while states with little residential demand peak slightly during the summer. When we control for state-specific seasonality by including state-specific month fixed effects, we find that both the pre-dye coefficients are positive. Controlling for state-specific seasonality, atypically cold months are associated with increased fuel oil demand -the effect is pronounced in states with high proportion of residences using fuel oil for home heating. Across all three specifications, we find that the post-dye, degree day, home heating interaction term is positive and significant -consistent with an increase in seasonality post-dye in states with high demand for home heating oil.
Evasion estimation using elasticities
In this section, we empirically apply three aspects of the model described in Section 3. First, we test for evasion in the pre-dye and post-dye periods by estimating separate price and tax elasticities. Second, we use these estimated coefficients to obtain estimates of the gradient of evasion with respect to taxes. Finally, we describe how evasion's response to the tax rate alters the revenue effects of increasing the diesel tax. The advantage of each of these applications is that they require only observing taxed gallons, and as a consequence, could be broadly applied outside of the context of diesel fuel. In the current application, we are able to observe the primary untaxed alternative, which we can use to support the validity of our estimates of the evasion-tax gradient.
Testing for evasion
As shown in the appendix, we can separately identify the tax and price elasticities by factoring price out of ln(p + t). We will estimate a version of (1) for diesel fuel that includes the log of the price and the log of (1 + t/p) as separate regressors:
We estimate the model using the Brent crude spot price and our dummy variables corresponding to the first and second Iraq Wars and the 2002 Venezuelan Oil Strike as instruments for ln(p it ) and ln(1 + τ it /p it ).
Absent evasion, demand for taxed diesel should respond equally to a change in taxes and prices. 24 As we derive in the appendix, the appropriate null hypothesis to test for the presence of evasion equates β 1 and β 2 -finding that β 1 is significantly greater than β 2 is consistent with the presence of evasion. Since our discontinuity results suggest that the dye program significantly 24 One caveat is if firms or consumers view changes in pre-tax prices to be transitory and changes in tax rates to be permanent, in which case these two elasticities could differ. First, if changing demand involves an adjustment cost, the response to a transitory price shock will be lower. Alternatively, if firms can substitute purchases over time, the response to transitory price shocks will be greater. However, we will show that the post-dye elasticities are the same, and that the timing of the narrowing of the difference between these elasticities matches with the implementation of the dye program. The aforementioned bias is unlikely to explain these two patterns.
curtailed evasion, we test the hypothesis separately for pre-and post-dye periods by allowing the coefficients β 1 and β 2 to vary pre-and post-dye.
We present the OLS and IV results for diesel fuel in columns 1 and 2 of Table 6 , respectively.
In the pre-dye period, our point estimates of β 1 and β 2 are -0.49 and -1.33 -the difference between the two coefficients is statistically significant, rejecting the null hypothesis of no evasion.
In the post-dye period, the point estimate of price elasticity falls to -0.24. Although the difference between the pre-and post-dye price elasticities is imprecisely estimated, the direction of the result is consistent with the findings of Hughes, Knittel and Sperling (2008), who find that gasoline demand elasticity was lower earlier this decade than in the late seventies. We find that demand also becomes more tax inelastic during the post-dye period -the point estimate for the post-dye tax elasticity is -0.83. The difference between the post-dye tax and price elasticities is not statistically significant.
We also investigate the response of fuel oil to the tax levied on diesel. In the absence of evasion, the tax on diesel should have no direct impact on fuel oil demand. 25 In columns 3 and 4
of Table 6 , we present the OLS and IV results of estimating (2) for fuel oil sales. In the pre-dye period, the tax rate has a significant and positive impact on fuel oil sales. When comparing the magnitude of the pre-and post-dye tax elasticities, we document a striking pattern over time. In the pre-dye period, the estimated tax elasticity is 2.184 and marginally statistically significant. Our estimate of the coefficient on the post-dye/tax rate interaction term is -1.995, which implies a post-dye tax elasticity of virtually zero. It is worth noting, however, that our estimate of the post-dye*after coefficient is not statistically significant. 26 In sum, the results are consistent with the presence of evasion in the pre-dye period, and suggest that fuel oil has ceased to be a mechanism for evasion in the post-dye period.
We next examine the pattern of elasticities over time by allowing the price and tax elasticities to vary by year. We estimate the following equation:
where we obtain estimates of β 1t and β 2t by interacting year dummies with the price and tax rate series. We examine the time path of elasticities for two reasons. First, constraining these coefficients to be constant over time masks any dynamic patterns of evasion. Second, exploiting the timing of changes in the estimated elasticities ameliorates concerns regarding bias in the demand estimation. Our estimates of the price and tax elasticities could be biased since variation in price could reflect shifts in demand and therefore movements along the supply curve. Estimating the elasticities by year allows us to examine the timing of the shift in the tax elasticity relative to the price elasticity. While estimates of the gap between these two may be biased, there is little reason for shifts in this gap to coincide with the timing of the dye program aside from a reduction in evasion.
In Figure 5 , we plot the yearly estimates of β 1 and β 2 for log diesel sales. In the pre-dye period, there is a consistent gap between the estimated tax and price elasticities. As further evidence that the timing of the tax responsiveness coincided with the dye program, we examine the time path of the elasticity of fuel oil with respect to the diesel tax rate. In Figure   6 , we plot the estimated yearly fuel oil tax rate elasticity. For almost every year prior to 1993, we estimate a positive tax elasticity. In 1993, this elasticity drops to close to zero. Unlike our estimates for diesel fuel, the responsiveness of fuel oil to the tax rate does not seem to reappear.
This suggests that any new evasion methods did not involve fuel oil.
Evasion response to tax
A parameter of significant interest in the public finance literature is the responsiveness of evasion to the tax rate. In the previous section, we arrived at a reasonable pre-dye estimate for this measure by examining the response of fuel oil to the tax rate, as this seems to be a primary mechanism for evading the diesel tax. In most settings, observing evasion directly is not possible.
In addition to suggesting a test for evasion using estimates of the price and tax elasticities, our model also demonstrates how the coefficients for β 1 and β 2 can be used to obtain an estimate of the degree to which evasion responds to the tax rate.
As derived in the appendix, we can express the derivative of evasion with respect to taxes as a function of the coefficients β 1 and β 2 from equation (2).
Importantly, this metric of evasion only depends on information about taxed sales, which are typically observable. In fact, the case of fuel tax evasion provides an unusual example in which untaxed sales are also available, and we use this extra information to evaluate the performance of our evasion estimate. From (4), we can obtain an estimate of the derivative of evasion with respect to taxes. We obtain average values for Q t and p from Table 1 and the coefficients β 1 and β 2 from the first column of Table 6 . In the pre-dye period, we estimate that each cent increase in the tax rate increased the quantity of unreported gallons by 16.5 thousand per day. In the post-dye period, this falls modestly to 15.4 thousand gallons per day. These values represent 1.1 percent and 0.7 percent of the average level of taxed diesel sold per day, respectively.
While these estimates rely solely on observing taxed gallons, we can assess their validity by comparing them to the pre-dye response of fuel oil to tax changes. From (2), we use the parameter estimate β 2 to obtain ∂Qu ∂t = Qu p+t β 2 . Plugging in for the average price, tax, and untaxed quantity in the pre-dye period, and using the estimate of β 2 from the third column of Table 6 , we find that increasing taxes by one cent increased purchases of fuel oil by 25.2 thousand gallons per day. This estimate is slightly larger than that obtained from taxed gallons, indicating that the latter may represent a conservative estimate of the evasion-tax gradient.
Evasion and tax revenues
Ideally we would like to state the response of evasion to taxes as an elasticity, though in a setting where the level of untaxed gallons is unobserved this is not possible. To put the evasion-tax gradient into perspective, we instead examine how tax revenues respond to changes in the tax rate, and how this is altered by tax evasion. The elasticity of revenue with respect to the tax rate captures the change in tax revenues arising from both the decreased consumption of taxed diesel fuel by compliant firms and substitution from legal to illegal purchases by non-compliant firms. These two effects are captured in equation (A21), restated here:
The term involving only β 1 captures the traditional behavioral response, while the final term reflects the effect of evasion. In the absence of evasion, β 1 and β 2 are identical, leading the latter term to disappear. We can therefore use our estimates of the price elasticity β 1 to obtain an estimate of the revenue effects of changing taxes if evasion were not present. In the pre-dye period, this implies an elasticity of revenue with respect to the tax rate of 0.85, and in the post-dye period this increases to 0.90. The erosion of the tax base due to greater evasion when taxes are increased, as documented in section 6.2, has a significant impact on the fraction of tax increases that are incorporated into revenues. Allowing for evasion, and therefore for the differing values of β 1 and β 2 , we find a revenue-tax elasticity of 0.60 in the pre-dye period and 0.71 in the post-dye period. A tax increase in the dye regime translates into 11 percent higher revenues than in the pre-dye period. Based on the estimates absent evasion, the lower price sensitivity post-dye can account for less than half of this.
Conclusion
This paper considers the evasion of diesel taxes, and how this evasion responds to the large shift in the cost of conducting an audit represented by the addition of red dye to untaxed diesel. The setting we consider provides a unique opportunity to observe both a taxed commodity as well as an untaxed substitute. We find that reducing the cost of audit greatly improves tax compliance, While the current application has the luxury of observing the evasion vehicle, untaxed fuel oil, it is often the case that only taxed quantities are observed. We apply a simple method for detecting the evasion of specific quantity taxes from the observed taxed quantities, and show how this method can be used to estimate the response of evasion to the tax rate. Finally, we use these measures to describe how evasion affects the tax revenue response to tax increases, a parameter of considerable interest in public economics.
The reduction in evasion we document post-dye has potentially large welfare consequences.
Resources spent evading taxes represent a pure deadweight loss. The additional tax revenue resulting from compliance efforts represents a first-order approximation of the welfare gain. If firms evade taxes until the marginal cost of evasion equals the tax rate, then the tax rate informs as to the deadweight loss associated with the marginal gallon of unreported taxable diesel, and we can estimate the welfare gain by multiplying the tax rate by the change in taxed gallons.
The average state plus federal diesel tax rate in 1993 was 39 cents per gallon. We estimate that taxed diesel sales rose by approximately 26 percent post-dye, or 7.1 billion gallons per year.
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A first-order approximation of the welfare gain is therefore $2.8 billion per year.
This should represent an upper bound of the welfare gain for several reasons. First, as
Chetty (2008) notes, if the penalty of being caught affects the marginal evasion decision, then the marginal cost of evasion will be less than the tax rate. Second, the marginal cost of evasion is likely to be increasing in evasion, which would imply that the average cost of evasion is lower than the marginal cost of evasion. Finally, the extent of fully evading firms will alter this calculation, as the marginal cost of evasion will be less than the tax rate for these firms and because the enforcement efforts will reduce their supply. Nonetheless, the improvement in efficiency is likely to be large.
Given the large efficiency and revenue gains, it is worth asking if the current level of investment in enforcement technologies is optimal. For instance, Baluch (1996) estimates that taxes 27 The average diesel sales were 75 million gallons per day in the 12 months prior to the dye program.
A Appendix
We consider a model of evasion in which a continuum of firms purchase diesel for on-road (taxed)
used. Firms choose a quantity of diesel fuel q to produce output x(q) and the percent of untaxed In addition to paying the cost of evasion, firms are penalized if caught evading taxes by the regulator. The regulator deters tax evasion by randomly auditing firms with an endogenous probability p a and assessing a fixed penalty, z, if q u > 0.
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First, the regulator observes z, f (γ), c a , p and t and credibly commits to auditing firms with probability, p a . 29 The regulator chooses p a to maximize tax revenues less enforcement costs,
given by
where Q t is the total purchases of the taxed diesel. 30 After the regulator chooses p a , each risk-neutral firm chooses q and α, conditional on γ, to maximize expected profits given by
Let q denote the quantity of diesel fuel satisfying (??) for interior solutions of α, given by
The threshold values for gamma separating full evaders(α * = 1), partial evaders (α * ∈ (0, 1)) and non-evaders(α * = 0) are defined by setting (??) equal to 1, and equating E[Π|α =
t qγ ] and 28 The fixed component of the penalty is a sufficient condition for the existence of entirely legal firms, so long as θ, the upper bound on the cost of evasion parameter, is sufficiently high. Our testable implications do not change if we generalizing the penalty function to allow for the penalty to vary linearly with the amount of untaxed diesel purchased. 29 We treat z as exogenously given. If the regulator can choose both pa and z, the optimal decision for the regulator is to set extremely high penalties and low enforcement.
30 We present the model in which fines do not enter into the regulator's objective function. The comparative static results do not substantively change with this inclusion or exclusion of the fines.
Conditional on p a , the optimal choices of q * (γ|p a ) and α * (γ|p a ) are given by
and Aggregate consumption of taxed diesel, Q t , and untaxed diesel, Q u , are given by
2p a z ))q and (A9)
Substituting (A9) into the objective function, the solution to regulator enforcement problem solves the first-order condition
Unlike the firm problem which, conditional on p a , is independent of the distribution of γ, the regulator's choice of p * a depends on the distribution of γ. Sinceγ NE is itself a function of p a , more than one value of p a may solve the first order condition. 31 In the event that more than one local solution to the first order condition exists, the regulator selects the solution for which the objective function is maximized. 32 The intensity of enforcement, p a , decreases with the cost 31 If the distribution of γ has a finite upper bound, note that a trivial solution to the first order condition is given by pa = 0. In the context of diesel fuel tax enforcement, we focus on interior solutions for pa consistent with regulator revealed preference.
32 A sufficient condition for a unique non-zero solution is f (γ) weakly monotonically increasing in γ. The sufficient condition, that there are weakly more consumers with higher costs of evasion than lower costs of evasion, is reasonable in the context of diesel fuel tax evasion.
of auditing, c a and increases with the tax rate, t. An increase in t increases the marginal benefit of auditing -an increase in c a increases the marginal cost of auditing. With a fixed penalty, z, the regulator's choice of audit intensity only affectsγ NE . Thus, 
A.1 Elasticity-based tests of evasion
We derive three sets of testable predictions if fuel tax evasion exists and if the use of fuel dye reduces evasion: (1) predictions of the magnitude of the discontinuity in sales before and after the introduction of the fuel dye, (2) predictions of the seasonality in fuel oil sales pre-and postdye, and (3) predictions of the price and tax elasticity of taxed and untaxed diesel fuel. The first two sets follow from the comparative statics of Q t and Q u . 33 We derive the elasticity-based test of evasion by comparing the short-run price and tax elasticity of diesel fuel. Comparing the derivative of Q t with respect to p and the derivative of Q t with respect to t, we have
Identifying the relative magnitudes of (A12) and (A13) is straightforward. Since Under the empirical specification we introduce in the empirical section,
we derive the appropriate null and alternative hypotheses.
33 Although omitted from the formal presentation of the model, we allow for the cost of evasion to be decreasing in the size of the legal market for untaxed diesel fuel, Q L u . In markets where legal sales of untaxed fuel are rare, evasion is likely to be more costly. If legal sales affect all firms heterogenous cost of evasion, we can model the effects as either a shift or a scalar expansion of f (γ). Allowing a more general distribution of γ given by γ ∼ f [θ1, θ1 + θ2], and allowing Taking derivatives with respect to p and t, we have
Absent evasion 34 , we would expect a unit change in price and a unit change in consumer tax incidence to have the same effect on taxed diesel sales. Thus,
A.2 Estimating Evasion and the Elasticity of Tax Revenues
To derive the expression for the change in evasion, we use the identity Q u = Q − Q t . Noting that a change in untaxed quantities from a change in the tax rate arises purely through evasion,
Expanding the derivative of total diesel sales in (A9) with respect to taxes, we have
Substituting (A15) and (A16), we can express the derivative of evasion with respect to taxes as a function of β 1 and β 2 above.
To derive the elasticity of tax revenues with respect to the tax rate, note that
34 In the multijurisdictional context, it is important to account for cross border sales in the specification. If our empirical specification is Log(Qit) = α + β1Log(pi) + β2Log(1 + t i p i )β3Log(pi + ti − (pj + tj)) + , we can work out a very similar result this case. In this case, the appropriate null hypotheses are β1 = β2 (no evasion) and β3 = 0 (no cross border effect)
To see how evasion contributes to this elasticity, consider adding and subtracting β 1 , giving: 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Avg. state diesel tax Number of states changing tax rate 5 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Robust standard errors are in parentheses allowing for clustering by state. *,**,*** denote significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% level, respectively. Post-dye is a variable indicating the period after the implementation of the dye program in October of 1993. The variable p+ t captures the tax inclusive price of diesel sold through retail outlets. The variable % HH oil represents the percentage of households in the state reporting in the 1990 census using fuel oil for home heating. The price is that charged for diesel through retail outlets. The quadratic time trend is allowed to differ in the pre-dye and post-dye periods. Robust standard errors corrected for clustering by state are in parentheses. *,**,*** denote significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% level, respectively. Other controls match those in the full specification shown in Table 2 . The dependent variable is the stated quantity in gallons per person per day. Each column of each panel represents a separate regression estimated for the stated sample. The first column restates the base specification using the full sample. Low oil states are states where the fraction of households using home heating oil is less than that of the median state. Low tax states are those whose diesel tax rate in October of 1993 is less than the median state. Robust standard errors corrected for clustering by state are in parentheses. *,**,*** denote significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% level, respectively.
+ denotes one-sided significance at the 90% level. Each specification also includes controls identical to those in the full specification shown in Table 2 . The pre-tax price in the diesel specifications is the price charged through retail outlets.
